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ABSTRACT: This paper reconsiders the predominant typology pioneered by Baumol (1990) among productive, 
unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship. It is shown that the foundation of Baumol’s classificatory scheme 
is the restrictive concept of first-best outcomes, and therefore it easily fails to appreciate the true impact of 
entrepreneurship in real world circumstances characterized by suboptimal institutions. We present an alternative 
way of generalizing the notion of entrepreneurship and show how and why it encompasses the Baumol typology 
as a special case. Our  main  distinction is between business and institutional entrepreneurship. We draw on 
Schumpeter and introduce the entrepreneur in an additional function: as a potential disturber of an institutional 
equilibrium.  Various  subsets  of  institutional  entrepreneurship  are  posited  and  discussed.  It  is  shown  that 
changing the workings of institutions constitutes an important set of entrepreneurial  profit opportunities. An 
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1 Introduction 
Just  two  decades  ago,  the  received  view  was  that  economic  growth  is  caused  by  the 
accumulation of factors of production. In his seminal contributions, Douglass North (e.g., 
1990) claimed that this is merely a proximate cause of growth, the ultimate causes residing in 
the incentive structure that encourages individual effort and investment in physical and human 
capital and in new technology. This incentive structure is in turn determined by ―the rules of 
the game in society‖ or the institutional setup. The role of institutions has, in recent years, re-
emerged as a dominant mainstream explanation of long-term economic performance (e.g., 
Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2005).  
 
William Baumol (1990) was a pioneer in examining the role of institutions in entrepreneurial 
behavior  and  analyzing  the  way  in  which  ―the  social  structure  of  payoffs‖  channels 
entrepreneurial  talent  to  different  activities  –  which  may  be  productive,  unproductive  or 
destructive. He assumed the supply of entrepreneurial talent to be roughly constant, and thus 
that  the rate of  growth  is  largely determined by  its  distribution across the three types  of 
entrepreneurship, which is in turn determined by the institutional setup. 
 
Baumol’s (1990) typology dividing entrepreneurial activities into productive, unproductive 
and destructive forms has proven to be an intuitive and appealing way of expanding the set of 
activities  that  require  entrepreneurial  talent  (see,  e.g.,  Minniti  2008).  It  has  played  an 
invaluable role in highlighting the role of institutions and accelerated our understanding of the 
growth  and  welfare  effects  of  entrepreneurial  activity.  Recently,  the  typology  has  been 
especially  influential  as  research  has  sought  to  dig  deeper  into  the  particularities  of 
unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship. It is, therefore, important to examine more 
closely the assumptions on which his theory rests. 
 
Baumol (1990) focuses primarily on institutions as an allocation device. However, analyzing 
institutions solely as allocation devices overlooks the fact that the institutional framework 
within which an activity is performed often determines whether this activity is productive, 
unproductive or destructive. In particular, what appears to be an unproductive activity may in 
many circumstances be a second-best substitute for inefficient institutions.  
   2 
Provision  of  second-best  substitutes  is  an  important  instance  of  a  more  general  set  of 
phenomena in which entrepreneurial activities change the workings of the institutional setup. 
This  partly  obfuscates  the  role  of  institutions  as  an  allocation  mechanism  by  creating  an 
analytical  circularity.  How  can  the  structure  of  rewards  that  allocates  talent  itself  be 
determined by the application of this talent? One way out of this dilemma is to acknowledge 
that  institutions  become  targets  for  entrepreneurial  innovativeness  because  changing  their 
workings is a means of earning or enhancing entrepreneurial profit. 
 
There is a strong possibility of earning profit by changing the way formal institutions affect 
other agents, particularly when current institutions are costly for productive activities. By 
relaxing  institutional  restrictions  on  productive  entrepreneurship,  these  efforts  may  be 
welfare-improving, even though they are driven mainly by individuals’ incentives to earn 
profit. 
 
We build on this insight to extend the concept of entrepreneurship in a novel way, going 
beyond purely business related activities. As with Baumol’s typology, our proposal goes back 
to  Schumpeter  (1934).  In  contrast  to  Baumol,  who  defines  the  entrepreneurial  function 
exclusively in terms of Schumpeter’s notion of entrepreneurship as innovative combinations, 
we assign the additional function of disturbing an equilibrium to the entrepreneur. 
 
We  propose  a  typology  consisting  of  business  entrepreneurship  and  institutional 
entrepreneurship.  The  allocation  between  these  types  is  determined  by  potential  rewards 
embedded in the existing institutional setup and in the production system. The two types of 
entrepreneurship disturb, respectively, the production system and the institutional equilibrium. 
An activity that disturbs  the institutional  equilibrium  could  be a novel  welfare-improving 
second-best  substitute  for  inefficient  institutions,  but  may  also  reduce  welfare.  Baumol’s 
typology is shown to fit nicely into our new proposal as a special case in which the welfare 
consequences of the activity at hand are known ex ante. 
 
The next section outlines the most important features of Baumol (1990) and the manner in 
which the literature has evolved. Section 3 sheds light on some subtle limitations of Baumol’s 
typology and the preconditions for its application. In Section 4, we make a case for our own 
contribution and discuss how it extends Baumol’s theory. The concluding section offers a 
summary and looks forward to further work.   3 
2 Baumol’s typology 
Baumol’s  analysis  represents  an  essential  step  in  bringing  institutions  to  the  fore  of  the 
analysis  of  the  role  of  entrepreneurship  in  economic  development.  By  referring  to  basic 
microeconomic assumptions, it is hypothesized that core entrepreneurial talents  – such as 
creativity, alertness  and  the ability to  get  things  done –  are used to  maximize individual 
utility, not  social  welfare.  It  then follows that entrepreneurship  is  not  necessarily welfare 
enhancing.  
 
Baumol’s  analysis  rests  on  two  premises.  First,  he  assumes  entrepreneurial  talent  is 
reasonably equally distributed across time and societies, but that its manifestation crucially 
depends  on  the  institutional  setup.
1  Second,  he  follows  Schumpeter  and  defines  the 
entrepreneurial function as the carrying out of new combinations. Baumol (1990, p. 897) 
presents his theory as an extension of Schumpeter’s five types of combinations:
2 
 
To derive more substantive results from an analysis of the allocation of entrepreneurial resources, 
it is necessary to expand Schumpeter’s list, whose main deficiency seems to be that it does not go 
far enough […] Schumpeter’s list of entrepreneurial activities can usefully be expanded to include 
such  items  as  innovations  in  rent-seeking  procedures,  for  example,  discovery  of  a  previously 
unused legal gambit that is effective in diverting rents to those who are first in exploiting it.  
 
Based  on  this  extension,  Baumol  builds  a  typology  of  productive,  unproductive  and 
destructive  entrepreneurship.  The  classification  of  activities  into  one  of  these  three  types 
depends  on  several  criteria:  Do  they  increase  overall  productivity?  Do  they  entail  a 
redistribution that leaves overall productivity unaffected, or do they reduce it? Those who 
have referred to Baumol have often explicitly interpreted this as positive, zero and negative 
shifts  of  the  production  possibility  frontier  (e.g.,  Coyne  and  Leeson  2004).  What  is 
noteworthy  here  is  that,  clearly,  an  activity  cannot  be  properly  assigned  to  one  of  the 
categories until its effect on productivity has been determined. 
 
The strong conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that inefficient institutions not only 
forgo opportunities for social benefit by hampering productive entrepreneurship, but that they 
may as well direct entrepreneurial talent towards activities that reduce aggregate productivity 
and social welfare. This has naturally been seen as an important contribution to the literature 
                                                 
1 This idea was concurrently pursued with respect to managerial talent by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991). 
2 According to Schumpeter (1934, p. 66), entrepreneurial activities can consist of the: (i) introduction of a new 
good (or a new quality of a good); (ii) introduction of a new method of production; (iii) opening of a new 
market; (iv) conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or semi-manufactured goods; and (v) 
implementation of a new organizational form.   4 
on long-term growth (e.g., Hall and Jones 1999; Jones 2001). Micro -oriented studies have 
explored the implications of the allocation  of talent  (e.g., Acemoglu 1995; Baumol 1993, 
2002). Recently, some interest has been focused on the particularities of the unproductive and 
destructive forms of entrepreneurship. For example, Desai and Acs (2007) sketch a theory that 
addresses occurrences of destructive entrepreneurship, and Coyne and Leeson (2004) and 
Smallbone and Welter (2002) apply the concepts in the context of a transition economy. Some 
progress towards empirical operationalization and assessment of the theory  has also been 
made (Sobel 2008). 
 
Before turning to our central issue, we want to draw attention to one of the core assumptions 
often overlooked when the Baumol typology is used. The problem is grasping the relevance of 
the unproductive category. In the proposed framework, entrepreneurial talent is viewed as a 
resource, and hence it is subject to scarcity of supply. Thus, even when entrepreneurial talent 
is channeled to unproductive activities that appear merely to entail a lump sum redistribution 
of  resources,  this  necessarily  must  also  involve  an  opportunity  cost  due  to  foregone 
productive potential. If unproductive activities are defined in terms of zero net effect on 
productivity, then this set of activities is very likely to be far too small to be of practical 
relevance. Henceforth, we simply merge Baumol’s unproductive and destructive categories 
using the common label ―non-productive‖. 
 
3 A reconsideration of Baumol’s typology 
Although the main message of Baumol’s (1990) paper offers important insights into a range 
of issues, we still believe that fundamental aspects of the theory need closer scrutiny. By 
uncovering some preconditions for a proper application of the Baumol typology, we also 
discuss some caveats that point towards our own contribution. In particular, it will be valuable 
to recognize clearly and to elaborate on the inconsistency in treating institutions solely as  
allocation mechanisms. However, before turning to this issue, we need to clarify our notion of 
efficiency. 
 
Institutions in Baumol’s theory play the role of allocating entrepreneurial talent. He therefore 
(implicitly)  defines  inefficient  institutions  in  terms  of  allocation  into  less  productive 
categories.  However,  the  welfare  evaluation  that  necessarily  predates  assignment  into  the 
typology should be conducted against the backdrop of a more general notion of inefficiency.   5 
To unfold  its essential aspects, we will promulgate a highly stylized notion of efficiency. 
Productive activities, i.e., a market based provision of some (consumer) good or service, are 
simply assumed to be inherently efficient. Other, non-productive, activities are efficient or 
inefficient depending on whether they facilitate or hamper productive activities. Similarly, 
institutions are called efficient or inefficient depending on their positive or negative effect on 
productive activities. 
 
It is important to realize that the different types of entrepreneurship all refer to a function, 
rather than an individual. The same individual could be engaged in both productive and non-
productive activities at the same time. To see why this is relevant, imagine a business owner 
who (in an innovative fashion) finds his way through the bureaucratic red -tape and finally 
acquires  a  production  license.  This  is  wasteful  because,  given  first-best  institutions,  this 
entrepreneur could have put his energy into productive activities. The same conclusion cannot 
be  drawn  given  the  actual  institutional  setting  that  the  business  owner  faces.  Given  that 
setting, it is clear that the non-productive activity was a prerequisite for subsequent productive 
activities. This might hold even if the acquired license is a monopoly license, in which case 
the prevailing institutions are probably even less efficient. Even in this case, non-productive 
entrepreneurship may be a way of breaking a bureaucratic deadlock preventing the license 
from being handed out at all.
3  
 
More generally, activities which at first glance appear to be obvious examples of  non-
productive  entrepreneurship  routinely  provide  a  second -best  substitute  for  inefficient 
institutions. The two additional examples of corruption and the Mafia  f urther illustrate this 
point. 
 
It is a long debated issue whether  corruption greases inefficient institutions or puts sand in 
efficient (or inefficient) institutions (Méon and Sekkat 2005). To be specific, inefficiency here 
refers to an overly bureaucratic governance structure and costs of red tape. Recent empirical 
studies show that the proposition that corruption reduces growth depends on the institutional 
setup. Méon and Weill (200 8) and Klapper  et al. (2006) find that the effect of inefficient 
                                                 
3 In addition to reducing the negative implications of unproductive entrepreneurship, one can also hypothesize 
that there exists a positive effect from poorly functioning institutions. This could be the case where institutional 
barriers function as a gate-keeping mechanism, only letting the most talented entrepreneurs through. De Meza 
and Webb (1999), for instance, study a setting in which banks have incomplete information about the ability of 
heterogeneous entrepreneurs. They show that, under these assumptions, too many agents of lower ability obtain 
funding. Hence, credit rationing may serve a gate-keeping function against low quality projects.   6 
institutions is smaller when the level of corruption is high.
4 Dreher and Gassebner (2007) find 
that corruption reduced the negative effect from  inefficient institutions on entrepreneurial 
entry. These results indicate that, in some cases, it may be fruitful to view non-productive 
forms of entrepreneurship as a second-best productive response to suboptimal institutions. 
 
Another  example  of  entrepreneurship,  which  at  first  sight  belongs  to  the  non-productive 
category, is the Mafia. This is often mentioned as a prototypical example of violent extortion 
and appropriation of rents created by others. However, some scholars have argued that, under 
unstable institutional circumstances, or poor enforcement of property rights, organized crime 
can actually provide a substitute. Bandiera (2003) discusses the way in which the Sicilian 
Mafia thrived in a situation in which the old feudal system was reformed and landholdings 
redistributed to the private sector without the concomitant creation of public institutions for 
law enforcement. In a similar vein, Milhaupt and West (2000) argue that organized crime in 
Japan is a natural response to inefficient institutions. Organized crime is, in their words, ―an 
entrepreneurial response to inefficiencies in the property rights and enforcement framework 
supplied by the state‖ (Milhaupt and West 2000, p. 43). Mafia activity in these Hobbesian 
situations might actually make the environment at least somewhat more predictable for the 
productive entrepreneur. 
 
These examples show that the classification into productive, unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurship  is  by  no  means  straightforward,  as  Baumol  himself  recognizes  in  later 
writings (Baumol 1993). The Baumol typology does not, and was never meant to, give any 
guidance  as  to  how  to  classify  activities  prior  to  making  theoretical  and  empirical 
investigations. In particular, as the above examples show, possible second-best effects must 
be taken into account prior to classifying any activity. 
 
The possibility that entrepreneurship provides second-best institutional solutions is interesting 
partly  because  of  its  significance  in  the  real  world,  which  is  rife  with  imperfection  and 
inefficiencies  (Rodrik  2008).  For  our  purposes,  these  activities  also  have  an  important 
theoretical implication. One cannot acknowledge that they, in effect, change the workings of 
formal  institutions,  but  remain  blind  to  the  fact  that  they  also  change  the  social  reward 
structure which, according to Baumol (1990), allocates entrepreneurial talent. Thus, without 
                                                 
4 Of course, arguments have also been put forward against the ―greasing the wheels‖ hypothesis. See Dreher and 
Gassebner (2007) for references.   7 
taking  these  effects  into  consideration,  we  cannot  unambiguously  determine  how  formal 
institutions will channel talent. 
 
This problem never surfaces in Baumol (1990), because his purpose is to evaluate different 
institutional setups, not different entrepreneurial activities. Baumol’s analysis is (implicitly) 
conducted against the backdrop of first-best institutions. It is noteworthy that Baumol (1990) 
discusses historical cases (Ancient Rome, China under the Sung Dynasty and England in the 
Late  Middle  Ages),  in  comparison  to  which  modern  Western  institutions  appear  to  be  a 
reasonable proxy for first-best institutions. Hence, his analysis is consistent given its stated 
aim and the historical contexts he uses. 
 
4 Institutional entrepreneurship 
This  section presents  an alternative way of extending the notion of entrepreneurship. We 
argue  that  this  extended  notion  has  several  distinct  advantages  compared  to  the  Baumol 
typology. 
 
4.1 Entrepreneurial opportunities 
The  possibility  that  non-productive  entrepreneurship  provides  second-best  solutions  to 
institutional shortcomings points to a potential simultaneity problem, where the structure of 
payoffs  which  determines  the  allocation  of  entrepreneurial  effort  is  itself  affected  by  the 
outcome of the allocation. This  logical  circularity can only be resolved by looking more 
closely at the mechanisms behind the allocation of talent.  
 
In Baumol’s (1990) theory, the allocation mechanisms reside in the social reward structure, 
and there are no explicit feedback effects on the reward structure itself. To find fruitful ways 
out  of  this  deadlock,  let  us  ask  the  following  question:  ―What  gives  incentives  to 
entrepreneurs  to  provide  second-best  solutions?‖  The  obvious  answer  is  the  potential  to 
exploit profit opportunities, or, as we will call them, rents. The perhaps less obvious insight 
offered by this  answer  is  that the institutional setup  itself provides ample entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  We  will  call  attempts  to  exploit  such  opportunities  institutional 
entrepreneurship,  in  contrast  to  business  entrepreneurship  where  profits  emanate  from 
innovations in the production system.   8 
 
To highlight the similarity in objectives between the two types of entrepreneurship, we will 
henceforth say that they are both driven by opportunities to earn rents (rather than profit). We 
define rents as rates of return exceeding the risk-adjusted market rate of return  or return in 
excess of a resource owner’s opportunity cost (Tollison 1982). An alternative is to define rent 
as the part of the payment for a resource that has no effect on its supply (Alchian 1987). 
However,  on  this  definition,  it  is  implicitly  assumed  that  rents  exist  exogenously,  while 
entrepreneurship  in  our  theory  entails  the  creation  and/or  discovery  of  rents,  thereby 
influencing the supply of entrepreneurship and other complementary factors of production.
5 In 
order to avoid potential confusion, we abstain from calling the entrepreneur a rent seeker. The 
reason is that our definition of this term, which is in line with how it is used in much of t he 
entrepreneurship literature, differs from its use in public choice (e.g., Tullock 1967; Buchanan 
1980). 
 
Entrepreneurs can secure the kind of unique resources needed to generate rents in several 
ways.  Obvious  examples  include  patents  on  valuable  innovat ions,  copyright,  skillful 
implementation  of  tacit  knowledge  that  cannot  be  imitated,  and  other  entrepreneurial 
innovations that require a resource unavailable to potential competitors.
6  In the broadest 
sense,  the opportunities  to  earn  a  rent  all  involve the  possession  of  some resource  or 
technology that is unique or at least in very limited supply.
7 It is important to realize that there 
is in principle no difference in this respect between the possession of a patent and the 
possession of knowledge of how to   best  avoid costs imposed by the tax code, or the 
possession  of  highly  valuable  production  knowledge  and  valuable  personal  connections 
enabling  one’s  firm  to  circumvent  cumbersome  regulations  even  if  this  requires  paying 
kickbacks to government officials. 
                                                 
5 See, e.g. Lewin and Phelan (2001), Alvarez (2007) and Henrekson (2007) for a discussion of entrepreneurial 
rents using the term as it is used here. 
6 Few rents last forever, and the durability varies substantially. Rents decay rapidly when they are based on 
activities that are easy to imitate and when the knowledge or skill is not embodied in a specific individual or 
organization.  In  such  cases ,  the  rents  are  often  called  ―Marshallian‖  or  quasi-rents.  Normally,  imitating 
competitors  enter  the  market,  which  increases  the  supply  and  lowers  the  price.  Alternatively,  the  original 
entrepreneur cuts prices in order to deter entry. According to calculations by Nordhaus (2004), entrepreneurs 
retain on average a mere two percent of the surplus generated by their activities. Institutional entrepreneurs also 
face competition, as other agents learn and adopt their methods of using institutions for their own benefit. 
7 We are only interested in rents earned by entrepreneurial – i.e., innovative – activity. One may argue that some 
resources that are not in limited supply, such as guns, are often used to appropriate rent through sheer force. 
However,  in  most  instances,  such  activities  are  not  innovative,  and  therefore  not  entrepreneurial.  When  an 
innovative activity requires the use of weapons (e.g., the Mafia), it is not the weapons in themselves which are 
unique, but the fashion in which they are put to use (e.g., in building the organization). This said, it is still true 
that many new military instruments have been innovative in themselves.    9 
 
In our view, all entrepreneurial activities are directed towards the discovery or creation of 
opportunities to earn rents. Having said this, it is important to realize that the discovery or 
creation  of  opportunities  to  earn  rents  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  an  activity  to  be 
classified  as  entrepreneurial.  In  the  next  section,  we  will  connect  to  the  notion  of 
Schumpeterian equilibrium disruption, thereby  requiring an entrepreneurial  activity to   be 
innovative and non-routine. Moreover, it is a natural simplification to limit the analysis to 
such entrepreneurs who are primarily engaged in business activities. Thus, we exclude the 
forms of entrepreneurship in which the agent has de jure decision power over institutions, 
often referred to as political entrepreneurship (e.g., Holcombe 2002; Wohlgemuth 2000).  
 
4.2 Foundations revisited 
The distinction made above between different kinds of entrepreneurship was, in contrast to 
Baumol (1990), drawn without reference to Schumpeter’s notion of new combinations. Before 
turning  to  more  concrete  examples,  it  is  advantageous  to  discuss  how  another  aspect  of 
Schumpeter’s  work  may  be  useful  in  building  a  theory  related  to  institutional 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Modern entrepreneurship research draws mainly on two closely related aspects of Schumpeter 
(1934): The theory of new combinations and the theory of how the entrepreneur disturbs an 
existing  equilibrium  (the  theory  of  creative  destruction).  The  first  theory  describes  what 
constitutes an innovation. In its most trivial (but clearly unfair) interpretation, this is a mere 
list of examples of entrepreneurial activities. By assigning the role of disrupter of equilibrium 
to  the  entrepreneur,  the  theory  of  new  combinations  explains  how  this  disruption  is 
accomplished. 
 
The usefulness of the theory of new combinations is indisputable, but we find it even more 
fruitful  to  dwell  on  the  second  aspect,  the  entrepreneur  as  a  disturber  of  an  existing 
equilibrium. Baumol (1990) builds his typology on whether the innovation is a combination 
of  productive  or  rent-seeking  technologies.  Our  proposal  is  to  separate  different  types  of 
entrepreneurship based on where the entrepreneurial activity causes disruption. We extend the 
Schumpeterian notion of entrepreneurship to instances in which the entrepreneur disrupts the   10 
institutional equilibrium. Following this reasoning, institutional entrepreneurship
8 emerges as 
an important object of study in a theory that involves endogenous institutions  (cf. Acemoglu 
2009). 
 
One way to endogenize institutions is to consider a political economy growth system in which 
different types of political power shape the institutional setup , which will in its turn affect 
production processes (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2005). An equilibrium can then be characterized 
in terms of the state of institutions as well as the state of the production system.
9 In relation to 
such an equilibrium, we may talk about institutional or business entrepreneurship depending 
on where the disruption takes place (Douhan and Henrekson 2008). 
 
An alternative to considering changes to formal institutions within a full -blown political 
economy system is to distinguish between codified and effective institutions. Examples of 
codified institutions include written laws, constitutions and procedural rules governing agents 
in the bureaucracy. When taking seriously the notion of institutions as rules that govern the 
behavior of agents, what matters is in most cases not the formal versions of institutions but 
how they work in practice, i.e., how they are implemented and enforced. We will refer to 
these as effective institutions.
10 
 
In  the  next  section,  we  provide  examples  of  the  manner  in  which  institutional 
entrepreneurship changes effective institutions. To see how that analysis differs from one 
building on a full-blown political economy system, consider the phenomenon of lobbying.  In 
a modern society, this is probably the most obvious example of the way business interests try 
to  influence  the  political  sphere  and  formal  institutions  (Furlong  and  Kerwin  2005) .
11 
Successful lobbying creates a rent when changes in codified institutions are translated into 
changes in effective institutions, for instance ,  by  granting a firm a  monopoly position. 
                                                 
8 The term ―institutional entrepreneurship‖ has previously been used by Daokui, Feng and Jiang (2006) in a 
sense that resembles but is less general than ours.  
9 This could include informal institutions such as norms, value systems and codes of conduct, even though these 
are unlikely to have much relevance given the fact they are seldom, if ever, shaped by the acts of single agents. 
10 This is comparable to the alignment of governance structures with transactions taking place at level 2 of the 
institutional hierarchy in Williamson (2000). Alternatively, if we consider the effects in a full -blown political 
economy system, it may be app ropriate to see institutional entrepreneurship as taking place at level 3 (the 
institutional environment or the formal rules of the game). 
11  This type of entrepreneurship may be labeled political entrepreneurship and treated as a subgroup of 
institutional entrepreneurship. Political entrepreneurship does not per se require that the individual is engaged in 
commercial  activities,  but  refers  primarily  to  innovativeness  and  motivation  within  the  political  sphere 
(Holcombe 2002; Wohlgemuth 2000). Our definition of entrepreneurship abstracts from this subset.   11 
Institutional entrepreneurship directed towards effective institutions, in contrast, creates the 
rent more directly, for instance, by bribing a government official in order to earn special 




4.3 Categories of institutional entrepreneurship 
Institutions can have costly as well as beneficial effects on productive activities, i.e., they can 
be more or less efficient. In this section, to avoid confusion with more or less  efficiently 
implemented  institutions,  we  will  use  the  words  ben eficial  and  costly  institutions. 
Entrepreneurial opportunities reside in the reduction of the impact of costly institutions or the 
strengthening of the effects of beneficial institutions. In both cases , rents can be earned by 
strengthening the position of  a business  entity (activity) owned by the same individual, in 
which case we may find it useful to talk about  evasive entrepreneurship. Rents can also be 
earned  from  selling  a  service  or  contractual  arrangement  that  reduces  or  strengthens  the 
impact of a certain institution on another agent. We will focus our discussion on this latter 
kind of institutional entrepreneurship pertaining to market transactions. 
 
One can imagine four basic ways of earning a rent by sale of a contract or a service to a third 
party: A, selling something that enhances the workings of beneficial, but poorly implemented, 
institutions; B, selling something that reduces the workings of harmful institutions; C, selling 
the withdrawal of a threat to strengthen harmful, but weakly implemented, institutions; D, 
selling the withdrawal of a threat to reduce the effect of beneficial institutions.
13 Note that 
there exist two extreme cases. First, where and when an institution is perfectly implemented, 
rents can only be earned by reducing (or threa tening to reduce) its effectiveness. Second, 
where and when an institution is mere window dressing with negligible effect, rents can only 
                                                 
12 Lambsdorff (2002) questions the validity of treating lobbying as equally wasteful as corruption. However, 
although the distinction made in this paper between the two types of institutional entrepreneurship comes close 
to the distinction between corruption and lobbying, it is different in that we draw the distinction primarily with 
respect to whether codified or effective institutions are altered. There is no contradiction involved in assuming 
that corruption is used to wield influence over codified institutions and lobbying is directed towards changing 
effective institutions.  
13  Institutions may arise as market outcomes when there is no formal governance. Formal institutions are 
important to mitigate market  failures due to incomplete or asymmetric information and commitment and 
enforcement problems. A lack of public provision of such institutions provides ample opportunities for private 
agents to offer alternative solutions. This is neatly summarized by Dixit   (2004,  p.  97):  ―[E]very  economic 
problem is an economic opportunity. Someone who can solve the problem, turning the potential gains into actual 
ones, may be able to charge a fee for this service.‖ This is a special case of A.   12 
be earned by increasing (or threatening to increase) its effectiveness. Our examples below 
relate to institutions that are in between these polar possibilities.  
 
It is crucial to recognize that we do not claim that the activities of institutional entrepreneurs 
discussed  below  necessarily  enhance  social  welfare.  The  words  beneficial  and  harmful 
institutions refer rather to the effect that the institutions have on productive activities. Hence, 
our analysis is relevant to the micro level, i.e., the effect on individual productive agents. As 
illustrations  of  beneficial  institutions,  we  will  consider  the  protection  of  private  property 
rights  and  the  possession  of  production  licenses  or  other  deeds  that  grant  the  holder  a 
monopoly right. Concrete examples of institutions that have potentially harmful effects on 
productive activities may include tax codes and ill-designed environmental legislation.
14 
 
A protective service provided by the Mafia is an example of the first kind of entrepreneurship 
(enhancing the workings of beneficial, but poorly implemented, institutions). As shown by 
Bandiera (2003) and Milhaupt and West (2000), suc h services can stabilize and make the 
environment  of  productive  activities  more  predictable  when  the  State  is  incapable  of 
upholding law and order. The Mafia is then in possession of the unique resource of being able 
to provide protection of private property. The (informal) contract between the Mafia and the 
business  provided  with  protection  may  to  some  extent  be  considered  as  a n  increased 
protection of property rights, yielding a rent to the Mafia. 
 
Another example of the first kind of institutional entrepreneurship is when an agent manages 
to acquire some monopoly rights, i.e., a unique resource. This monopoly right can be sold or 
licensed to a productive agent in order for the latter to increase profit.  The initial owner then 
receives a rent that accrues to his ability to identify the value of, and to obtain, the monopoly 
right in the first place. Note that, although an institutional setup that allows for monopoly 
licenses is likely to be inefficient from a social point of view, they are nonetheless still 
valuable for the individual productive agents. 
 
Institutional entrepreneurship that reduces the effect of institutions  harmful to the individual 
(but not necessarily to society) (B) is probably the most common. Tax consultants who come 
                                                 
14 We only consider partial equilibrium effects in the sense that the firm does not take into consideration positive 
externalities of taxes (e.g., provision of educated labor and infrastructure) and environmental legislation (e.g., 
long-run positive effects of a conserved environment and a sustained supply of resources).   13 
up with innovative ways of lawfully evading taxes  are  a good example. A parallel logic 
applies to innovative ways of adjusting productive activity so that the cost-increasing effects 
of environmental standards are mitigated.  The unique resources in these cases consist of 
superior  knowledge  of  the  way  the  rules  laid  down  in  the  formal  institutions  can  be 
sidestepped. Institutional entrepreneurship entails innovations, such as finding loopholes or 
inconsistencies in the regulatory framework. Such knowledge may be used to avoid detection 
by enforcing agencies or to appeal to if prosecuted. 
 
Examples of institutional entrepreneurship of type C  (withdrawal of a threat to strengthen 
harmful, but weakly implemented, institutions) include litigation and systematic economic 
fraud.  Numerous  kinds  of  litigation  may  be  viewed  as  invoking  some  legal  paragraph 
according to which the subject is (at least potentially) punishable. Depending on the severity 
of the sanction, the subject is willing to pay the institutional entrepreneur in order to avoid the 
charge. Tax codes and environmental legislation may be mentioned as obvious examples of 
institutions that may be invoked, as well as the class  action suits leveled against entire 
industries in the US (smoking, asbestosis). The kinds of innovations made by the institutional 
entrepreneur are similar to the ones mentioned under type B. 
 
We mentioned some types of acquisition of production licenses as examples of type A. Seen 
from the perspective of the bureaucrat or the official in charge of production licenses, there is 
also scope for entrepreneurship of type D  (withdrawal of a threat to reduce the effect of 
beneficial  institutions).  This  may  occur  when  the  bureaucrat  threatens  to  withdraw  a 
production or monopoly license. A firm possessing such licenses is, in many cases, willing to 
pay the bureaucrat in order to maintain their effectiveness.  In highly corrupt countries, this 
type  of  threat  may  be  part  of  the  routine.  Under  other  circumstances,  entrepreneurial 
innovativeness is required to assess the value of the license and make the threat credible in a 
specific institutional setup.  
 
The essential point of all these examples is that entrepreneurial activities should be evaluated 
against a well specified characterization of current conditions.  The relevant context is the 
actual institutional setup, which, in all contemporary and historical instances, deviates from 
the first-best ideal. Hence, it is imperative to take into account the second-best effects. This 
certainly does not mean that institutional entrepreneurship is always welfare-improving from 
a social point of view. First, institutional entrepreneurship can (and, in many cases, does)   14 
impose an additional burden on the productive agent. Second, the net effect must include an 
objective assessment of which alternative productive activities the talent could instead have 
pursued.  
 
To the extent that  a welfare evaluation points to a negative welfare effect of institutional 
entrepreneurship, it is consistent to view it as an instance of Baumol’s non-productive types of 
entrepreneurship. Given that these are, ex ante, merely a subset of the universe of activities 
we call institutional entrepreneurship, our suggested classification is arguably more general. 
 
Moreover, our emphasis on second-best substitutes does not preclude the kind of evaluations 
of  institutions  that  Baumol  (1990)  conducted.  First-best  institutions  are  still  a  relevant 
benchmark  for  such  evaluations.  However,  these  should  be  compared  with  the  effective 
institutions  rather  than  the  formal  institutions,  and  therefore  the  role  of  the  effect  of 
institutional entrepreneurs must be taken into consideration. 
 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the fact that an activity is conducted in search of a rent is 
not a sufficient condition for it to be labeled entrepreneurial. If bribery is part of routine 
business  conduct,  it  is  not  an  entrepreneurial  activity,  but  rather  an  integral  part  of  an 
established institutional equilibrium. Similarly, if every interest  group repeatedly employs 
more or less identical lobbying tactics, this is also part of an institutional equilibrium. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
William Baumol’s classic 1990 JPE paper opened up a new research tradition at the nexus of 
entrepreneurship and institutions. We have argued that, in order to take this field forward, it is 
necessary to take a second look at some of the foundations of Baumol’s theory. Our intention 
has not been to attack the conclusions of Baumol and his followers, but to provide a more 
general theory that escapes some of the problems inherent in the typology used. 
 
In particular, we have stressed that it is difficult within the boundaries of the typology to 
account  for  entrepreneurial  activities  which  are  second-best  substitutes  for  inefficient 
institutions. These activities are important because they can alter institutions in ways that 
make them more efficient. This observation has far-reaching consequences for an evaluation 
of the welfare consequences of entrepreneurial activities. In particular, it clearly reveals that a   15 
welfare evaluation based solely on a comparison with first -best institutions may be highly 
misleading. Second, the possibility that entrepreneurial activities are second-best substitutes 
for  inefficient  institutions  necessitates  a  reconsideration  of  the  role   of  institutions  as  an 
allocation device. 
 
We argue that a distinction between business and institutional entrepreneurship is better able 
to capture allocation effects of institutions. What these diverse types of entrepreneurship have 
in common is that it  makes perfect sense to regard them as a search for rents. There is no 
difference in principle between earning a rent (a rate of return exceeding the risk -adjusted 
market rate of return) through the possession of a patent or by virtue of superior knowledge of 
how to exploit institutions to one’s economic advantage. 
 
Additional support for our proposed distinction can be mounted by going back to the main 
source of inspiration for Baumol: Joseph Schumpeter. Whereas Baumol draws on the concept 
of new combinations, we build rather on the concept of the entrepreneur as a disturber of 
equilibrium. This neatly connects the discussion of different types of entrepreneurship with a 
more  general  theory of  the political  economy of  growth.  An equilibrium in  a full  blown 
political economy model should always include both the production system and political and 
economic institutions. Both business and institutional entrepreneurs disturb this equilibrium, 
but do so in different parts of the model. 
 
An important task for future research is to answer the question: Which features of institutions 
make them more amenable to innovative modification of their effectiveness? A result that 
emerges  from  our  analysis  is  that  such  features  would  increase  the  susceptibility  to 
institutional  entrepreneurship.  We  hypothesize  that  institutional  dimensions  such  as 
complexity and consistency are fruitful avenues for future research. To give some rationale 
for this hypothesis, consider the difference between countries with a highly complex tax code 
and those with  a flat tax.  Prima facie, our theory  predicts that the former system breeds 
significantly more institutional entrepreneurship than the latter.  
 
Our main conclusion is that entrepreneurial activities cannot be classified as socially wasteful 
without a contextual understanding of the way they interact with the institutional setup, and 
possibly remedy for some of its deficiencies. This is an extension of the argument put forward 
in Rodrik (2008) — institutional changes which at first sight look like improvement may in   16 
reality  come  into  conflict  with  prevailing  second -best  solutions,  thereby  reducing  the 
appropriateness of the institutional setup. Conversely: A ban on entrepreneurial activities that 
appear to be wasteful when gauged against a fi rst-best institutional  Nirvana may actually 
increase the cost of malfunctioning institutions. 
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